Following His Excellency the President Mokgweetsi Masisi’s automatic succession to the Presidency, some are arguing that the automatic succession clause in our constitution is unconstitutional.
Others are arguing that section 35(1), read together with sections 35(3) and 35(4) envisages a situation where the Vice President only assumes office temporarily pending the election of President by the National Assembly under section 35(4) and in line with the procedure under section 35(5).
In arguing their case, many have started at section 35 of the Constitution. In my view, this debate should commence with section 34. Section 34(1) provides that “the President shall, subject to the provisions of this section, hold office for an aggregate period not exceeding 10 years beginning from the date of his first assumption of office of President after the commencement of this Act.
Section 34 is cardinal for it is the one that impels a sitting President whose term has ended to cease being President, allowing, by operation of law, the Vice President to assume the office of President by operation of section 35(1). Section 35(1) provides that “whenever the President dies, resigns or ceases to hold office, the Vice President shall assume office as President with effect from the date of the death, resignation or ceasing to be President.”
In terms of section 35(1), therefore, when a sitting President whose term has ended ceases to be President, the Vice President immediately assumes the office of President. There is no vacancy occasioned because the succession is instant and simultaneous. The assumption of office by the Vice President in terms of section 35(1) is not temporary. It is up to the election of the new President, which in our case would ordinarily be after a general election.
Section 35(3) provides that “any person performing the functions of the President by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall not exercise the power of the President to revoke the appointment of Vice President or dissolve Parliament.” The former Attorney General, Dr. Athalia Molokomme, whose statement was published in the Botswana Daily News of 1st April 2008, rightly conceded that a literal interpretation of section 35(3) read together with section 35(1) may lead some to believe that in terms of section 35(1), a Vice President who comes in as President would have limited powers, viz, that he cannot revoke the appointment of the Vice President, or dissolve Parliament.
She also proceeded to say “…such an approach may also lead to a mistaken belief that section 35(4) of the Constitution would apply to the person who assumes office as President under the current dispensation…” â€¨â€¨I agree with Dr Molokomme when she says “this, however, is not the correct position of the law. It will be recalled that the repealed subsection 35(1) provided for a 'caretaker' President, as it were, for seven days, and that it therefore made sense to restrict his powers under section 35(3)…”
She continues to say “… because the current provision puts in place a substantive President, subsection (3) should have ideally been consequentially amended by the removal of the reference to subsection (1). That this was not done is a minor drafting oversight which … has no material consequence on the validity of the automatic succession constitutional provision.”â€¨
Therefore, the argument that section 35(1), read together with sections 35(3) and 35(4) envisages a situation where the Vice President only assumes office temporarily pending the election of President by the National Assembly under section 35(4) and in line with the procedure under section 35(5) cannot be sustained.
That notwithstanding, Dr. Molokomme is right that it may legitimately be asked why section 35(4) was retained, or what purpose it is meant to serve. I agree with her that the answer to that question can be found in section 35(2). As she rightly asserts, “this section provides a solution for a situation where a person has assumed the office of President under the automatic succession clause (35(1)), following which, a vacancy occurs through the death or resignation of the President, and there is no Vice President.”
She is also right in concluding that “in such a situation, section 35(4) would kick in to ensure that there is no lacuna in the Presidency…” Further that “…it is this President who is subjected to the '7 day rule', and not the substantive President who assumes office under section 35(1).”â€¨
That former president Khama ceased to be President at midnight on 31st March 2018 and President Mokgweetsi Masisi was only inaugurated on 1stApril 2018 in the morning, does not mean that before his inauguration he was not President and there was, therefore, a vacancy in the office of President.
The Attorney General, Advocate Abraham Keetshabe, is right in arguing that, in our law, a President does not assume the Presidency at the time of taking the oath of office; the oath is to allow him to perform his functions, not to appoint him is President. In terms of section 35(2) “if the office of President (a) becomes vacant in circumstances in which there is no Vice President; or (b) is vacant whilst the Vice President is absent from Botswana or is by reason of physical or mental infirmity unable to perform the functions of his office, the functions of President shall, until such time as a new President assumes office in accordance with this section or section 32 of this Constitution, be performed by such Minister as the Cabinet shall appoint.”
This is the section that creates a vacancy in the office of President and in terms of which there can be no automatic succession to the office of President. But, this is not the section at issue in the present matter. To repeat, the section at issue is section 35(1) which, in my view, inarguably constitutionalizes automatic presidential succession. This could be the end of the argument, but for completeness I now turn to the other constitutional provisions which touch on the vacancy and tenure of office of President.
Firstly, section 35(4). It provides that “if the office of President becomes vacant, the National Assembly shall, unless Parliament is dissolved, and notwithstanding that it may be prorogued, meet on the seventh day after the office of President becomes vacant, or on such earlier day as may be appointed by the Speaker, and shall elect a person to the office in such manner as is prescribed by the next following subsection, and, subject thereto, by or under an Act of Parliament.
Secondly, section 35(6). It states that “ no business other than the election of a President shall be transacted at a meeting of the National Assembly under subsection (4) of this section or under section 32(6) of this Constitution and such a meeting or any sitting thereof shall not be regarded as a meeting or sitting of the Assembly for the purposes of any other provision of this Constitution.”
These are the sections in terms of which the President is ordinarily elected after general elections. These sections are not applicable for automatic presidential succession and are, therefore, irrelevant for our discussion. Thirdly, section 32(6). It provides that “where (a) any candidate in an election of a President dies during the period commencing with the taking of the poll in the Parliamentary election and ending when the result of the election has been ascertained and that candidate would, but for his death, have been entitled to have been declared elected as President under subsection (3) of this section;
It continues to say or (b) the returning officer declares in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) (d) of this section that no candidate has been elected, the new National Assembly shall meet on such day(not being more than 14 days after the result of the election is ascertained or, as the case may be, the declaration that no candidate has been elected) as the Speaker shall appoint, and shall elect a person to the office of President in such manner as prescribed by section 45(5) of the Constitution and subject thereto by or under an Act of Parliament. Such an election shall take place before the election of the Specially Elected Members of the National Assembly.”
This section too is not applicable to automatic presidential succession since it involves elections and is, therefore, irrelevant for our discussion. Fourth, section 32(7). It provides that “a person elected to the office of President under this section shall assume that office on the day upon which he is declared elected.”
It is needless to state that this section too is not applicable to automatic presidential succession and is, therefore, irrelevant for our discussion. This is because a section 35(1) President is not elected, but automatically becomes President when his predecessor dies, resigns or ceases to hold office. To repeat, I submit that section 35(1) constitutionalizes automatic presidential succession in Botswana. Whether some believe that it is undemocratic to the extent it does not allow for contest is another matter.
But to argue that a system which finds unequivocal expression in the constitution is unconstitutional is unmeritorious. How can something provided for in the constitution be unconstitutional? Usually, we talk of a provision of an Act of Parliament being unconstitutional if it is inconsistent with the constitution in which case it must be struck down for constitutional invalidity.
No wonder, as cited in the book ‘Regime Change and Succession Politics in Africa: Five Decades of Misrule’ edited by Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi and Shadrack Wanjala Nasong'o, Keorapetse, Otlhogile, Dingake, Molomo, Good and Taylor do not fault automatic presidential succession for its unconstitutionalism, but fault it for, inter alia, being undemocratic and a bad model for Africa.
Dr. Molokomme was right when she wrote that “…the important difference between the old section 35(1) and the current one is that while the former provided for the Vice President to perform the functions of the office of President, the current one refers to the Vice President assuming office as the President with immediate effect…”
She continued to say “…Under the current section 35(1) therefore, the Vice President becomes the substantive President, unlike the earlier provision which simply gave him authority to perform the functions of that office until a new President assumes office” For purposes of refreshing our memory, the old section 35(1), which was repealed by the Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 1997, provided that “If the office of President is vacant, the Vice President shall, subject to the provisions of this section, perform the functions of the office of President until such time as a new President assumes office in accordance with this section or section 32 of this Constitution.”
This is the section which provided for the Vice President to assume office temporarily, but that section is no more, it having been repealed and its successor, section 35(1), not having been declared invalid by a competent court of law. Should there be litigation on section 35(1) the purposive rule of statutory interpretation will guide our courts. In interpretation the section, our courts would, over and above using the literal, mischief and golden rules of interpretation, consider the purpose for repealing the former section 35(1) and replacing it with the present.
That purpose is found in the Memorandum to the Bill (no 24 of 1996) which states, inter alia, that “…Clause 3 proposes to amend section 35 to provide for an automatic assumption of office of President by the Vice President in the event of the death or resignation of the President.” It is suggested that section 35(3) be repealed. It is not understandable why more than ten years since Dr. Molokomme commented on the need for such repeal, the section still lies in our constitution.
It is also suggested that those who strongly believe that automatic succession does not exist in our constitution or that it is unconstitutional take the matter to court so that it is settled once and for all to avoid the matter resurfacing every time a Vice President automatically ascends to the presidency.
At an economically tumultuous juncture of our country’s history as we presently are, where unemployment has become something of a Gordian Knot conundrum, a promisingly ameliorational pursuit known as Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) is well worth exploring as a salvavic option.
One pundit defines BPO as “a subset of outsourcing that involves contracting the operations and responsibilities for a particular business process to a third-party service provider.” Examples of BPO services, which invariably do not constitute a company’s core or primary mission, include inbound and outbound call centres, live chat, bookkeeping, web development, research marketing, accounting and finance, and after-hours call answering services. BPO is driven, fundamentally, by the imperative of cost-cutting and overrides national boundaries through the employment and deployment of technologies that make human and data communications easier, thus lending credence to the concept of the global village that is today’s world.
BPO had been in existence in its primordial form since as early as the 19th century but it was not until the 1980s that its latter-day incarnation loomed larger and the term outsourcing became part of daily business parlance. Today, every continent is into BPO, including the economic Dark Horse called Africa. The Global IT-BPO Outsourcing Deals Analysis segments BPO buyer regions into three categories. These are North and South America (42 percent); Europe, Africa, and the Middle East (35 percent); and Asia and Oceania 23 percent.
In a Third World country such as Botswana, overseas-oriented BPO is key to bringing in those paramount hard currencies besides engendering a radical turnaround in the all too dingy joblessness picture. But are we up to it folks? Have we gotten aboard the bandwagon or we are virtual spectators watching nonchalantly as the BPO locomotive streaks away at breakneck speed?
JAX’S FLASH-IN-THE-PAN SUCCESS
The extent to which BPO has taken root in Botswana is not apparent. The first time I heard of it was in August 2007, when the Botswana Qualifications Authority (BQA), then going by the name Botswana Training Authority (BOTA), put it on record at a one-day IFSC-organised conference that they were in the process of developing standards for the nascent BPO industry in Botswana whilst they benchmarked with Mauritius, the UK, and South Africa. Little, if anything at all, has been heard of their progress since.
In February 2018, The Botswana Guardian reported of the newly-established Direct BPO, a fully-owned subsidiary of Mascom, which was looking to employing 400 people at the very outset. Once again, details as to how Direct BPO, whose establishment coincided with Mascom’s 20-year anniversary, has fared to date remain sketchy.
Perhaps the most spectacular case of a BPO operation in Botswana was that of Oseg, a company begun by Majakathata Pheko, affectionately known as Jax, in 2003 under the Debtsolve franchise umbrella. Oseg, which comprised of three divisions, offered customer management and financial services solutions and operated out of Gaborone and Windhoek in Namibia, where it touted MTN as its principal client. Oseg did receivable management for local financial blue chips such as Barclays Bank, FNB, Bayport, MVA, Botswana Insurance Company, Letshego, and Standard Chartered, and in due course CEDA and Mascom. It also served the Australian offshore market. Its account receivable division was the biggest in Botswana, handling over 60,000 accounts and managing a portfolio of over P400 million.
At its height, Oseg employed 150 people and had spent over P15 million on cutting edge technology and manpower training. In 2007, Oseg was nominated for Best Non-European Contact Centre at the CCF Awards held that year in Birmingham, UK, the “Oscars of the industry”.
Then in 2016, the sky seemed to have fallen. Oseg found itself saddled with an odious P4.4 million debt, with its staff resultantly trimmed to just under 50. According to media reports, Jax pointed to his own bankrollers and their partners in the alleged crime as his rather devious saboteurs. “I have evidence that powerful people in the bank and a cabal of friends both inside and outside the bank were intentionally and aggressively looking for ways to weaken Oseg, tarnish its name and diminish its value as they were in the same competing business interests, in the call centre and the factoring business,” the then youthful entrepreneur, who was only 41 at the time, bemoaned.
Jax reported the matter to NBFIRA and what came of that, not to mention the continued viability of his business, I have not been able to establish. I just hope and trust that Jax personally weathered the tempest as I have it on good authority that he is doing fairly well.
BOTSWANA MISSING OUT ON DOLLAR-DENOMINATED BILLIONS
For emerging economies, and even peripheral Third World countries, the BPO business can be something of a gold mine. According to the latest McKinsey report, the global BPO industry is valued at $163 billon and is expected to grow at $183 billion by the year 2023.
In the Philippines, BPO, which began with a call centre setup way back in 1992, accounts for 11 percent of GDP, the single biggest contributor to the nation’s economic activity. It employs 1.3 million people in over 700 outsourcing companies. One company, called Teleperformance, alone employs 47,000 people in 21 sites. In 2019, the BPO sector generated revenues of the order of $26.3 billion.
In India, the BPO sector, now 30 years old, provides direct employment to 2 million people and indirect employment to 8 million. In 2019, the BPO income overall amounted to $8.6 billon. In Mauritius, the ICT/BPO sector contributed 6 percent to GDP in 2019, representing a key driver of the Mauritian economy. The BPO sector is responsible for 53 percent of the 27,000 people employed in the ICT/BPO superstructure in 850 companies.
According to the Economic Development Board of Mauritius, leading multinationals such as Accenture, Huawei, Aspen Pharmacare and Allianz have back office operations in Mauritius. In addition, a number of international payroll companies currently use Mauritius as a service delivery centre.
Kenya is also looking to position itself as a hub for global digital BPO, notably through government promotion schemes such as Ajira. According to the ITC Authority of Kenya, the market size for online work was estimated to be $4.8 billion in 2016 and was projected to generate $15 billon by 2020. With only 7000 people employed in the BPO industry in the country, we are talking about a modest figure though it is still brisk compared to the rather lugubrious situation in Botswana. Clearly, there are billions in US dollar terms to be had in BPO and we are missing out on these big time.
MZANZI LEAVES BW IN THE DUST
Yet it is Big Brother next door from whom we have precious much to glean as he is our immediate competitor potentially in the BPO race. Remember, if our IFSC continues to flounder to date, it is largely on account of the fact that in Mzansi, we have a formidable rival right on our doorstep.
As we speak, the South African BPO sector is valued at $461 million going by the invariably authoritative McKinsey survey. It employs 270,000 people in six cities, a figure projected to more than double to 775,000 by 2030. Of the current total staff base, 65,000 serve international clients. That South Africa has made such enormous strides in the BPO arena is meritoriously earned and not simply fortuitous. It has been voted the second most attractive BPO location in the world for three years on the trot.
The South African BPO sector is tipped to grow by 3 percent per annum over the next three years, a rate which is in line with the trends in the global BPO space. There are currently over 100 local and international BPO providers operating in South Africa, with local players in the main serving large multinational customers. The industry’s key offshore business clientele is domiciled in English-speaking countries, notably the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland, with 61 percent coming from the United Kingdom, 18 percent from the United States and Canada, and 11 percent from Australia.
In June this year, the $1.5 trillion-strong Amazon announced that it would be signing up a total of 3000 South Africans to help cater to its customers in North America and Europe, which is testament to the fact that the country’s BPO market continues to make waves in the Western world. If Jeff Bizos is impressed, you can count on the likes of Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg to follow suit too sooner rather than later.
A FORGONE OPPORTUNITY TO TURBO-CHARGE THE BPO INDUSTRY IN BOTSWANA
Empowerment Africa is an organisation that boasts a business network that enables established and emerging businesses to connect, partner, and create long-term value with Africa-based projects. With reportedly 3000 esteemed contacts, it liaises with governments, major corporations, and investors to facilitate business opportunities, deliver deal flow, and provide research across its network to the Empower Africa business community.
Empowerment Africa recommends seven countries in Africa with thriving outsourcing industries. They are Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Mauritius, and Madagascar in that order. Botswana is conspicuous by its absence and that must be ample cause for concern to our Monetary Authorities, especially given that at least on paper, we are economically better off than three to four of these countries.
In 2015, Jax approached the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture and propositioned a joint partnership with Oseg in unlocking BPO potential in Botswana by looking at the public sector Debt Collection and Call Centre services for government. Jax reckoned that the total market for Receivables and Revenue collections sitting in Government and Parastatal organisations at the time amounted to over P3.5 billion, equivalent to 8% of the National Budget then. If the BPO sector was to be utilised to assist in collecting this debt, over 2700 jobs would be created.
Furthermore, considering that a typical government employee spent half the time attending to inquiries from members of the public, the exercise would result in improved efficiency delivery in government departments in addition to boosting government’s liquidity position.
This is what Jax said in a 50th independence anniversary publication in 2016 on the same subject. “Our estimations are that once all the collections work is outsourced, there is a potential to collect more than P100 million every month for the Government of Botswana.
The opportunity to create more than 2700 exists, which will help to mop out unemployed graduates and upskill them. The economic impact of 2700 jobs would support more than 15,000 people in the economy and also help to create jobs in other industries that support the BPO sector, and will stimulate the whole ICT sector. Over and above that, the outsourcing would stimulate the whole IT sector and help improve Botswana’s position as an ICT and Call Centre hub.”
Once again, I am not privy to what came of this proposition, but I am persuaded that had government acceded to it, the BPO business in the country would have quantum-leaped and we would today be waltzing on the proverbial Cloud 9 in terms of revenues generated. Even the road retarder Oseg encountered with its bankers would not have been a factor at all. As significant, we would in all probability have made it on Empowerment Africa’s short list for the continent’s pre-eminent BPO addresses.
THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF GOVERNMENT IN BOOSTING BPO FORTUNES
Granted, with the advent of the still latent E-Governance, the synergic potential with the Call Centre business is stupendous. As per Jax’s pitch to those who care to hear, “The outsourcing of the E-Governance and collections will greatly improve efficiency in service delivery in the government departments. Directing traffic and enquiries to a Call Centre would empower the BPO sector in such a way that would be able to help the public from all over the country from one central point 24 hours and 7 days week.
The Call Centres would also relieve Government of the pressure to develop brick and mortar representations/offices across the country. This would help to save billions of Pula as the public will be able to access the services from the comfort of their homes and villages. The Call Centre service would bridge the urban and rural division as everyone will now be able to access Government services and receive the same service.”
The real jackpot both to government and the broader citizenry, however, resides in the offshore market. With sales cycles in the BPO business taking up to 12 months, contracts typically run from five to seven years, which is sustained lucrativeness by any measure. It is in the direction of the overseas market that much of our energy should be focused, though wary that we do not recklessly neglect the domestic market, if we are to reinvigorate the BPO industry and get meaningful returns out of it.
Developed countries are all the more keen to outsource as one way to insulate their economies against severe hurt inflicted by globalwide economic tremors. For instance, it was thanks to offshore outsourcing that Australia so ably navigated the 2008 economic crisis. That year, IBM released a BPO report showing that 80% of Australian companies were willing to outsource from offshore companies to save 50% in expenses.
Here in Botswana, I would recommend that government be in the BPO vanguard by splashing on a whole host of catalytic factors. In South Africa, for instance, the Department of Industry, Trade and Competition devoted R1.3 billion between 2007 and 2018 to bolstering the BPO industry in one way or the other and committed a further R1.2 billion in 2019 alone, gestures which no doubt underlie the solid performance of the industry.
Even when the lockdowns were in progress, the industry was accorded essential services status so that it kept the momentum going. As if not to be outdone, the South African BPO industry body, Business Process Enabling South Africa (BPESA), has commendably done its part in aiding the growth of the industry by supporting skills development, sharing best practice, and providing its members with access to other business networks and associations that drive and influence the sector’s transition into the digital economy. In Mauritius, the Prime Minister himself, and not a man of lesser stature, directly oversees the BPO sector.
For Botswana to make a mark in the BPO arena, it has to build a reputation as a reliable, cost-effective, and high-quality destination for outsourced business services, attributes all of which South Africa excels in. In addition, South African BPO players provide higher-quality services owing to strength across five key areas: availability of skills, infrastructure, risk profile, business environment, and industry size. In Botswana, we will need to nurture some of these strengths with the instrumentality of government.
With the advent of COVID-19, it is of essence that traditional BPO providers build capabilities to enable rapid deployment and ramp-up of fully functional teams under crisis scenarios. Operational resilience, that is, the ability to pivot when an ordinarily disruptive set of circumstances hits, is key. South Africa demonstrated this capacity most eloquently when 90 percent of the workforce was able to switch to remote work in residential settings, when 50 percent of operations in key competing locations such as the Philippines and India came to a virtual standstill.
Lastly but by no means the least, a competitive currency is a reasonably efficacious undercutting strategy. In recent months, the South African Rand has significantly weakened against the US dollar, in which the cost of outsourcing is typically denominated, and this has enabled South African BPOs to compete more effectively with Asian offerings.
It concerns me that last year, the Pula appreciated by 1.6 percent against the SDR (Special Drawing Right), which is a compound of five currencies, namely the US dollar, the British Pound, the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the Chinese Yuan. If that relatively ripped Pula trajectory persists, it will not help our BPO competitiveness at all Rre Moses Pelaelo.
Mighty Persian King ends Babylonian exile after 60 years
For all his euphoria and grandiose preparations for Nibiru King Anu’s prospective visit to Earth, General Atiku, Nebuchadnezzar didn’t live to savour this potentially highly momentous occasion. In fact, none of his next three bloodline successors were destined to witness up-close the return of the Planet of the Gods, as Nibiru was referred to in Sumerian and Egyptian chronicles.
Nebuchadnezzar died in 562 BC, having ruled for 43 years, missing Nibiru, which showed up circa 550 BC as we set down in The Earth Chronicles series, by a whisker. During the next 6 years, he had three successors in such an unconscionably short period of time. His immediate one was Merodach, his eldest son.
In Botswana, the Trade Disputes Act, 2016 (“the Act”) provides the framework within which trade disputes are resolved. This framework hinges on four legs, namely mediation, arbitration, industrial action and litigation. In this four-part series, we discuss this framework.
In last week’s article, we discussed the third leg of Botswana’s trade dispute resolution framework-industrial action. In this article, we discuss the fourth leg, namely litigation at the Industrial Court. The Act does not define the term litigation. Litigation is generally understood to mean a situation where parties to a trade dispute take their dispute to a court, in this case the Industrial Court, for determination by a judge.
Just like an arbitrator, a judge’s decision is binding on the parties though they can, of course, appeal it. However, while an arbitrator must be acceptable to both parties, a judge does not have to be acceptable to the parties. A party can, however, apply for the judges’ recusal from the case for such reasons as reasonable apprehension of bias.
Before discussing litigation at the Industrial Court, it is apposite that a brief background of the origins and evolution of the Industrial Court be given. The original Trade Disputes Act (No. 19/1982) provided for disputes to be adjudicated, inter alia, by a Permanent Arbitrator. This is confirmed in Veronica Moroka & 2 Others v The Attorney General and Another, Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. CACGB-121-17 at para 11.
The Industrial Court replaced the institution of the Permanent Arbitrator (Dingake Collective Labour Law in Botswana 23) following the enactment of the Trade Disputes Act (No. 23/1997) which, as confirmed in the Veronica Moroka case supra, came into force on 9 October 1997.
As per Kirby JP, in the Veronica Moroka case supra, the Industrial Court’s status “as a court was uncertain and no provision was made for it to be served by a Registrar, with the usual powers and duties of such office”.
The Court of Appeal, in Botswana Railways Organization v Setsogo and Others, 1996 BLR 763 CA, remedied this defect. It held that the Industrial Court was not a mere statutory tribunal, but was, in line with Section 127(1) of the Constitution of Botswana, a subordinate court, having limited jurisdiction.
Following the change of the definition of subordinate court by Act 2/2002 to exclude the Industrial Court, along with the Court of Appeal, the High Court and a court martial, the Industrial Court became a superior court, albeit still with limited jurisdiction unlike the High Court, for instance, which has inherent unlimited jurisdiction.
Consequently, appeals from the Industrial Court were referred to the Court of Appeal. Perhaps most significantly, according to Veronica Moroka, Industrial Court judges were now, just like High Court judges, protected by, inter alia, security of tenure.
The Trade Disputes Act was further amended and replaced by the Trade Disputes Act, 2003 which commenced on 6 April 2004 as Act No. 15 of 2004. Section 16(8) of this Act provided for the appointment of the Registrar and an Assistant Registrar, but still had no section clothing them with specific powers.
It, through section 20(3), also bestowed, in the Court, the power to hear urgent applications and, in terms of section 18(1), the power to grant interdicts, thereby remedying the defects identified in Botswana Railways Organization v Setsogo & Others supra, but it still had no provision dealing with writs of execution and sales flowing therefrom.
In terms of section 18(1) of the Act, the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction includes the power to hear and determine all trade disputes except disputes of interest as well as, in terms of section 20(1) (b) of the Act, the power to interdict any unlawful industrial action and to grant general interdicts, declaratory orders or interim orders.
In terms of section 20(1) (c) of the Act, the Industrial Court is also clothed with the power to hear appeals and reviews of the decisions of mediators and arbitrators respectively. It, in terms of section 20(1) (d) of the Act, has the power to direct the Commissioner to assign a mediator to mediate a dispute if it is of the opinion that the matter has not been properly mediated or requires further mediation.
In terms of section 20(1) (e) of the Act, the Industrial Court also has the power to direct the Commissioner to refer a dispute that is before the Court for arbitration. In terms of section 20(1) (f) of the Act, it has the power to refer any matter to an expert and, at the Court’s discretion, to accept the expert’s report as evidence in the proceedings.
The Industrial Court also has the power to give such directions to parties to a trade dispute provided the object of such directions is the expedient and just hearing and determination or disposal of any dispute before it.
In terms of section 20(2) of the Act, any matter of law and any question as to whether a matter for determination is a matter of law or a matter of fact is decided by the presiding judge. In terms of section 20(3) of the Act, with respect to all issues other than those referred to under section 20 (2), the decision of the majority of the Court prevails.
Where there is no majority decision under section 20 (3), the decision of the judge prevails. In terms of section 24(2) of the Act, any interested party in any proceedings under the Act may appear by legal representation or may be represented by any other person so authorised by that party.
In terms of section 28(2) of the Act, a decision of the Industrial Court has the same force and effect as a decision of the High Court, and because, unlike South Africa, Botswana has no Labour Appeal Court, decisions of the Industrial Court, just like those of the High Court, are, in terms of section 20(5) of the Act, appealable to the highest court in the land, that is, the Court of Appeal.
The Trade Disputes Act went through another amendment in 2016. Section 14 of the Act ensures the continuation of the Industrial Court. It outlines its functions as the settlement of trade disputes as well as the securing and maintenance of good industrial relations in Botswana.
In terms of section 15(1) of the Act, the judges of the Industrial Court are appointed by the state President from among persons possessing the qualifications to be judges of the High Court as prescribed under section 96 of the Constitution.
In terms of section 15(2) of the Act, these judges are headed by the President of the Industrial Court designated by the state President from among the judges.
In terms of section 15(4) of the Act, a judge of the Industrial Court who is not a citizen of Botswana or who is not appointed on permanent and pensionable terms may be appointed on contract basis and is eligible for reappointment.
In terms of section 15(5) of the Act, Judges of the Industrial Court sit with two nominated members, one of whom is selected by the judge from among persons nominated by the organisation representing employees or trade unions in Botswana and the other selected by the judge from among persons nominated by the organisation representing employers in Botswana.
In terms of section 15(6) of the Act, where, for any reason, the nominated members are or either of them is absent for any part of the hearing of a trade dispute, the jurisdiction of the court may be exercised by the judge alone or with the remaining member of the Court, whichever the case may be, unless the judge, for good reason, decides that the hearing should be postponed.
In terms of section 18(1) of the Act, An Industrial Court judge vacates office on attaining the age of 70 years, provided that the state President may permit him or her to continue in office for such period as may be necessary to enable him or her to deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that had commenced before him or her.
In terms of section 18(2) of the Act, in accordance with the provisions of the proviso to section 96(6) of the Constitution, a person appointed to act as an Industrial Court judge vacates that office on attaining the age of 75 years.
In terms of section 19(1) (a) and (b) of the Act, an Industrial Court judge may be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his or her office, whether arising from infirmity of body or mind, or from any other cause or for serious misconduct.
In terms of section 19(2) of the Act, the power to remove an Industrial Court judge from office vests in the state President acting in accordance with the procedure provided under section 97 of the Constitution for the removal of High Court judges.
*Ndulamo Anthony Morima, LLM(NWU); LLB(UNISA); DSE(UB); CoP (BAC); CoP (IISA) is the proprietor of Morima Attorneys. He can be contacted at 71410352 or email@example.com