Sekgoma aLetsholathebe (1873-1914) was Kgosi of the Batawana from 1891 until his removal from power by the British in 1906. As a ruler he was both talented and ruthless. Through his charisma and skilful use of patronage, he also came to command broad support among his subjects. This was especially true of those who were not at the time considered to be the paternal descendents of the morafe's original, Bangwato, founders.
It is widely held that Sekgoma assumed the throne as regent for the then under age Mathiba (1888-1933), who was the son of his elder brother Kgosi Moremi II (1855-1891). Moremi II had ruled the Batawana from 1877 until 1891, during which time the kingdom had prospered. A highlight of Moremi II's reign had been his decisive victory over invading Amandebele in the 1884 battle at Khutiyabasadi.
Moremi and Sekgoma were born of different mothers. Their father, Kgosi Letsholathebe I (c.1830-74; ruled from 1847-74) had had at least eight wives, but only three living sons at the time of his death. The mother of Moremi was Mphepheng, who had been a Mongwaketse captive of the Amandebele before escaping to Ngamiland. Her marriage to Letsholathebe was confirmed shortly after the latter assumed bogosi. Before then she is said to have been the wife of one of Letsholathebe's age mates.
Sekgoma's mother, Boleko, was a daughter of the Bangwato Kgosi Sekgoma I, and thus a half-sister to his successor Khama III. She died while giving birth to Sekgoma, a few months before Letsholathebe's own death.
During Moremi's reign, Sekgoma was raised in the household of his uncle Dithapo aMeno. A prominent kgosana who was also Moremi's paternal cousin, Dithapo arranged for Sekgoma to spend much of his youth away from the court at a distant cattle post. There it is said that he underwent a form of initiation with local Khoe (Basarwa), prior to his 1891 bogwera.
The above genealogical background is of significance given that once in power Sekgoma, with Dithapo's support, insisted that he was Letsholathebe's true heir. This ambition for bogosi had shown itself earlier, in 1889-90, when Sekgoma had twice attempted to seize power. A notable aspect of these incidents was that Sekgoma had apparently enjoyed the support of a group of Wayeyi, who Batawana in general then considered to be political subordinates.
The first coup occurred while Moremi was away on a hunting expedition. Sekgoma and his supporters were able to control the then capital, Tsau, for a few weeks until his return. A few months later Sekgoma regrouped to make a second attempt, but was defeated an armed skirmish. This event is confirmed by European eyewitnesses, but is seemingly forgotten local oral traditions.
There were thus already serious political divisions within the Batawana state when Moremi died only a few months after crushing Sekgoma's second rebellion. Dithapo presided over the kgotla that installed Sekgoma in the face of considerable resistance by a faction led by another prominent kgosana, Thabeng Mogalakwe.
Relations between Bo-Mogalakwe and Bo-Sekgoma were soon worsened when Sekgoma took as his first wife Seokoneng, who was then married to Nakedi, the son of Thabeng.
Thereafter, questions arose as to whether he was properly crowned as a ruler in his own right or was merely acting as the Motswaraledi-Kgosi or Regent for his young nephew Mathiba aMoremi II.
In the months immediately preceding his installation, Ngamiland, that is the then core area of the Gatawana kingdom, became part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This was a direct result of the Anglo-German boundary agreement of 1890, which resolved a wide range of territorial disputes between the two countries.
Prior to 1890, Germany had made its own claims over Ngamiland with a number of official and private expeditions. Having been disappointed with the harsh environment of central Namibia, some Germans saw Ngamiland as a logical place to expand white settler farming.
Writing in an 1886 volume of the semi-official Deutsche Kolonialzeitung (German Colonial Journal) one such advocate had declared that the Batawana could be easily relieved of their land as they were "small and weakly built and morally and physically degenerate", adding: "The richest of the Tawana kaffirs possess horses and guns, but they are unable to use them well."
The above contempt for Batawana martial prowess ran counter to earlier observations by another German, Schulz, who in 1884 had noted that Moremi II could field a mobile strike force of about 5000 armed men. The build up of Batawana military might had begun under Letsholathebe and continued during the reigns of both of his sons, Moremi and Sekgoma. This had allowed the Batawana to successfully resist incursions by the Makololo, Amandebele and Boer Dorseland trekkers, while expanding their hegemony over such other groups as the Wayeyi, Bananjwa, Hambukushu and various Khoisan or Basarwa communities.
As the late Professor Tlou has previously pointed out, by the 1880s the elite soldiers among the Batawana consisted of mounted troops, who were under the Kgosi's direct command. The strength of this royal cavalry had been augmented c.1882 by the purchase of 2000 modern breech-loading rifles. Below the cavalry were foot soldiers organised along the lines of traditional mephato and generally armed older muzzle-loading muskets.
Intelligence and Security Service Act, which is a law that establishes the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Service (DIS), provides for establishment of a Parliamentary Committee. Recently, the President announced nine names of Members of Parliament he had appointed to the Committee.
This announcement was preceded by a meeting the President held with the Speaker and the Leader of Opposition. Following the announcement of Committee MPs by the President, the opposition, through its leader, made it clear that it will not participate in the Committee unless certain conditions that would ensure effective oversight are met. The opposition acted on the non-participation threat through resignation of its three MPs from the Committee.
The Act at Section 38 provides for the establishment of the Committee to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Directorate. The law provides that the Parliamentary Committee shall have the same powers and privileges set out under the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act.
On composition, the Committee shall consist of nine members who shall not be members of Cabinet and its quorum shall be five members. The MPs in the Committee elect a chairperson from among their number at their first meeting.
The Members of the Committee are appointed by the President after consultation with the Speaker of the National Assembly and Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. It is the provision of the law that the Committee, relative to its size, reflect the numerical strengths of the political parties represented in the National Assembly.
The Act provides that that a member of the Committee holds office for the duration of the Parliament in which he or she is appointed. The Committee is mandated to make an annual report on the discharge of their functions to the President and may at any time report to him or her on any matter relating to the discharge of those functions.
The Minister responsible for intelligence and security is obliged to lay before the National Assembly a copy of each annual report made by the Committee together with a statement as to whether any matter has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of the provision of the Act.
If it appears to the Minister, after consultation with the Parliamentary Committee, that the publication of any matter in a report would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Directorate, the Minister may exclude that matter from the copy of the report as laid before the National Assembly.
So, what are the specific demands of the Opposition and why are they not participating in the Committee? What should happen as a way forward? The Opposition demanded that there be a forensic audit of the Directorate. The DIS has never been audited since it was set up in 2008, more than a decade ago.
The institution has been a law unto itself for a longtime, feared by all oversight bodies. The Auditor General, who had no security of tenure, could not audit the DIS. The Directorate’s personnel, especially at a high level, have been implicated in corruption. Some of its operatives are in courts of law defending corruption charges preferred against them. Some of the corruption cases which appeared in the media have not made it to the courts.
The DIS has been accused of non-accountability and unethical practices as well as of being a burden on the fiscus. So, the Opposition demanded, from the President, a forensic audit for the purpose of cleaning up the DIS. They demand a start from a clean slate.
The second demand by the Opposition is that the law be reviewed to ensure greater accountability of the DIS to Parliament. What are some of the issues that the opposition think should be reviewed? The contention is that the executive cannot appoint a Committee of Parliament to scrutinize an executive institution.
Already, it is argued, Parliament is less independent and it is dominated by the executive. It is contended that the Committee should be established by the Standing Orders and be appointed by a Select Committee of Parliament. There is also an argument that the Committee should report to Parliament and not to the President and that the Minister should not have any role in the Committee.
Democratic and Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence is relatively a new phenomenon across the World. Even developed democracies are still grappling with some of these issues. However, there are acceptable standards or what might be called international best practices which have evolved over the past two or so decades.
In the UK for instance, MPs of the Intelligence and Security Committee are appointed by the Houses of Parliament, having been nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. This is a good balancing exercise of involvement of both the executive and the legislature. Consultation is taken for granted in Botswana context in the sense that it has been reduced to just informing the Leader of Opposition without much regard to his or her ideas; they are never taken seriously.
Furthermore, the current Committee in the UK has four Members of the ruling party and five MPs from the opposition. It is a fairly balanced Committee in terms of Parliamentary representation. However, as said above, the President of Botswana appointed six ruling party MPs and three from the opposition.
The imbalance is preposterous and more pronounced with clear intentions of getting the executive way through the ruling party representatives in the Committee. The intention to avoid scrutiny is clear from the numbers of the ruling party MPs in the Committee.
There is also an international standard of removing sensitive parts which may harm national security from the report before it is tabled in the legislature. The previous and current reluctance of the executive arms to open up on Defence and Security matters emanate from this very reason of preserving and protecting national security.
But national security should be balanced with public interest and other democratic principles. The decision to expunge certain information which may be prejudicial to national security should not be an arbitrary and exclusive decision of the executive but a collective decision of a well fairly balanced Committee in consultation with the Speaker and the minister responsible.
There is no doubt that the DIS has been a rogue institution. The reluctance by the President to commit to democratic-parliamentary oversight reforms presupposes a lack of commitment to democratization. The President has no interest in seeing a reformed DIS with effective oversight of the agency.
He is insincere. This is because the President loathes the idea losing an iota of power and sharing it with any other democratic institution. He sees the agency as his power lever to sustain his stay in the high office. He thought he could sanitize himself with an ineffective DIS Committee that would dance to his tune.
The non-participation of the opposition MPs renders the Committee dysfunctional; it cannot function as this would be unlawful. Participation of the opposition is a legal requirement. Even if it can meet, it would lack legitimacy; it cannot be taken seriously. The President should therefore act on the oversight demands and reform the DIS if he is to be taken seriously.
For years I have trained people about paradigm shifts – those light-bulb-switch-on moments – where there is a seismic change from the usual way of thinking about something to a newer, better way.
I like to refer to them as ‘aha’ moments because of the sudden understanding of something which was previously incomprehensible. However, the topic of today’s article is the complete antithesis of ‘aha’. Though I’d love to tell you I’d had a ‘eureka ‘, ‘problem solved’ moment, I am faced with the complete opposite – an ‘oh-no’ moment or Lost Leader Syndrome.
No matter how well prepared or capable a leader is. they often find themselves facing perplexing events, confounding information, or puzzling situations. Confused by developments of which they can’t make sense and by challenges that they don’t know how to solve they become confused, sometimes lost and completely clueless about what to do.
I am told by Jentz and Murphy (JM) in ‘What leaders do when they don’t know what to do’ that this is normal, and that rapid change is making confusion a defining feature of management in the 21st century. Now doesn’t that sound like the story of 2020 summed up in a single sentence?
The basic premise of their writing is that “confusion is not a weakness to be ashamed of but a regular and inevitable condition of leadership. By learning to embrace their confusion, managers are able to set in motion a constructive process for addressing baffling issues.
In fact, confusion turns out to be a fruitful environment in which the best managers thrive by using the instability around them to open up better lines of communication, test their old assumptions and values against changing realities, and develop more creative approaches to problem solving.”
The problem with this ideology however is that it doesn’t help my overwhelming feelings of fear and panic which is exacerbated by a tape playing on a loop in my head saying ‘you’re supposed to know what to do, do something’. My angst is compounded by annoying motivational phrases also unhelpfully playing in my head like.
Nothing happens until something moves
The secret of getting ahead is getting started
Act or be acted upon
All these platitudes are urging me to pull something out of the bag, but I know that this is a trap. This need to forge ahead is nothing but a coping mechanism and disguise. Instead of owning the fact that I haven’t got a foggy about what to do, part of me worries that I’ll lose authority if I acknowledge that I can’t provide direction – I’m supposed to know the answers, I’m the MD! This feeling of not being in control is common for managers in ‘oh no’ situations and as a result they often start reflexively and unilaterally attempting to impose quick fixes to restore equilibrium because, lets be honest, sometimes we find it hard to resist hiding our confusion.
To admit that I am lost in an “Oh, No!” moment opens the door not only to the fear of losing authority but also to a plethora of other troubling emotions and thoughts: *Shame and loss of face: “You’ll look like a fool!” * Panic and loss of control: “You’ve let this get out of hand!” * Incompetence and incapacitation: “You don’t know what you’re doing!”
As if by saying “I’m at a loss here” is tantamount to declaring “I am not fit to lead.” Of course the real problem for me and any other leader is if they don’t admit when they are disoriented, it sends a signal to others in the organisation stating it’s not cool to be lost and that, by its very nature encourages them to hide. What’s the saying about ‘a real man never asks for direction. ..so they end up driving around in circles’.
As managers we need to embrace the confusion, show vulnerability (remember that’s not a bad word) and accept that leadership is not about pretending to have all the answers but about having the courage to search with others to discover a solution.
JM point out that “being confused, however, does not mean being incapacitated. Indeed, one of the most liberating truths of leadership is that confusion is not quicksand from which to escape but rather the potter’s clay of leadership – the very stuff with which managers can work.”
2020 has certainly been a year to remember and all indications are that the confusion which has characterised this year will still follow us into the New Year, thereby making confusion a defining characteristic of the new normal and how managers need to manage. Our competence as leaders will then surely be measured not only by ‘what I know’ but increasingly by ‘how I behave when I accept, I don’t know, lose my sense of direction and become confused.
.I guess the message for all organizational cultures going forward is that sticking with the belief that we need all-knowing, omni-competent executives will cost them dearly and send a message to managers that it is better to hide their confusion than to address it openly and constructively.
Take comfort in these wise words ‘Confusion is a word we have invented for an order not yet understood’!