While it is fair to say that a relative decline in the political authority of bogosi by the early 1960s was a factor in opening the door for the emergence of nationalist political parties, both the chronology and extent to which traditional authority was eroded varied greatly across the then Bechuanaland Protectorate.
In many areas the institution of bogosi had been compromised by colonial interventions. In this respect the British most clearly destabilized the institution in a number of areas through the suspension and banishment on various pretexts of local rulers; beginning with Sekgoma Letsholathebe in 1906, who was notably followed by Sebele II in 1931, Molefi in 1936 and Seretse and Tshekedi Khama in 1950.
While in each of the above cases the British encountered little difficulty in ensuring the physical removal of the rulers concerned, they thereafter found it impossible to fully confer the deposed monarch's legitimacy upon their sanctioned successors.
The same pattern also held true for ungazetted local rulers, such as the Bakgatla bagaMmanaana Kgosi Gobuamang and the Bakalanga bakaNswazwi She John Madawu Nswazwi VIII. In the absence of legitimate local monarchs, monarchical legitimacy itself came under increased pressure.
Besides undermining bogosi in each case the colonial deposition of traditional authorities also gave rise to organized movements seeking their restoration. In Ngamiland between 1906 and 1912 the detention of “BagaSekgoma” faction leaders and the disarmament of their supporters failed to break a spirit of resistance that was only accommodated when about half of the reserve's population was allowed to join Sekgoma Letsholathebe in exile along the Chobe. While most subsequently returned following his death in 1914, a core of his loyalists has remained at Kachikau to this day.
During the 1930s supporters of Sebele II in Kweneng drew up mass petitions, enlisted the support of neighbouring merafe, and engaged in various acts of non-cooperation, including the non-payment of Hut Tax.
In Johannesburg, Bakwena migrant workers formed their own committee under the leadership of later Domkrag patriarch Sankoloba Matlabaphiri, which raised funds for a legal challenge to the authority of the colonial state along the lines of the Sekgoma's earlier appeal.
In the end the legality of Sebele II's deposition was upheld in the 1936 judgment in the case of Tshekedi Khama and Bathoen II versus the High Commissioner, which reconfirmed the latter's ultimate authority. Yet, the “BagaSebele” movement was only fully eclipsed in the wake of the exiled monarch's 1939 death and massively attended Molepolole burial.
Among the BagaMmanaana of Gangwaketse and BakaNswazwi of Gammangwato's Bukalanga periphery, militant organized support for Gobuamang and Nswazwi VIII was ultimately crushed by military force. Gobuamang's supporters were partially accommodated by their 1935-36 resettlement at Thamaga, while the old Nswazwi village was razed in September 1947, resulting in the flight of most of its population into then Southern Rhodesia.
The 1936 suspension of Molefi gave rise to what was arguably Botswana's first political party- “Lekgotla la Ipelegeng”. Formed by commoners Ralefela Motsisi and Kgosi Lebotse, but enjoying the patronage of the MmaKgosi Seingwaeng, Ipelegeng took its name from Molefi's farewell appeal to his supporters to “help themselves” in his absence.
Like the BagaSekgoma and BagaSebele, its tactics were initially confined to petitioning, raising money for lawyers, and acts of non-cooperation. Declared an illegal organization in 1938 it re-emerged among Bakgatla servicemen during the Second World War as Ipelegeng II.
With Molefi's post-war restoration Ipelegeng II attempted to devote itself to community development projects, but the Kgosi ultimately turned on the movement himself. In the 1960s many of its surviving members were, nonetheless, prominent in a new Kgatleng movement for commoner empowerment, “Mphetsebe”.
The latter organization's immediate objective was to make Linchwe II's progressive sister Tshire regent, in place of his conservative uncle Mmusi and his dikgosana advisors. Instead, their agitation resulted in Linchwe's own early installation. Thereafter, with Linchwe's alleged encouragement, leading Mphetsebe and ex-Ipelegeng members led by Defatlhwe Seame and Madisa Moremi, along with Tshire, embraced the BPP.
In Gammangwato the 1950 banishment of Seretse also gave rise to institutionalised opposition that later fed into the rise of national political parties. There members of the Malekantwa mophato, including such figures as Lenyeletse Seretse, Moutlakgola Nwako and Kenneth Koma, were especially tenacious in their opposition.
In June 1952, following the "Serowe kgotla riot", the Malekantwa activists supported Leetile Raditladi's attempt to form a Bamangwato National Congress (BNC), which also incorporated such established figures as Kgalemang Motsete and Monametse Chiepe.
Opposed to Seretse's more traditionalist royal supporters led by Keaboka Kgamane as well as the pro-Tshekedi “dikgosana” of the “BagaRametsana” faction, BNC members vaguely stood for democratic reform, as well as Seretse's restoration.
In their first months they nominated Seretse's half sister Oratile Ratshosa, the widow of Simon Ratshosa and a veteran opponent of Tshekedi in her own right, as regent. But, this was rejected by the British who in May 1953 imposed BagaRamaetsana member Rasebolai Kgamane. Never a mass movement, after Seretse Khama’s return from exile, the BNC faded into an occasional label for a loose network of Bangwato reformists.
Intelligence and Security Service Act, which is a law that establishes the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Service (DIS), provides for establishment of a Parliamentary Committee. Recently, the President announced nine names of Members of Parliament he had appointed to the Committee.
This announcement was preceded by a meeting the President held with the Speaker and the Leader of Opposition. Following the announcement of Committee MPs by the President, the opposition, through its leader, made it clear that it will not participate in the Committee unless certain conditions that would ensure effective oversight are met. The opposition acted on the non-participation threat through resignation of its three MPs from the Committee.
The Act at Section 38 provides for the establishment of the Committee to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Directorate. The law provides that the Parliamentary Committee shall have the same powers and privileges set out under the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act.
On composition, the Committee shall consist of nine members who shall not be members of Cabinet and its quorum shall be five members. The MPs in the Committee elect a chairperson from among their number at their first meeting.
The Members of the Committee are appointed by the President after consultation with the Speaker of the National Assembly and Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. It is the provision of the law that the Committee, relative to its size, reflect the numerical strengths of the political parties represented in the National Assembly.
The Act provides that that a member of the Committee holds office for the duration of the Parliament in which he or she is appointed. The Committee is mandated to make an annual report on the discharge of their functions to the President and may at any time report to him or her on any matter relating to the discharge of those functions.
The Minister responsible for intelligence and security is obliged to lay before the National Assembly a copy of each annual report made by the Committee together with a statement as to whether any matter has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of the provision of the Act.
If it appears to the Minister, after consultation with the Parliamentary Committee, that the publication of any matter in a report would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Directorate, the Minister may exclude that matter from the copy of the report as laid before the National Assembly.
So, what are the specific demands of the Opposition and why are they not participating in the Committee? What should happen as a way forward? The Opposition demanded that there be a forensic audit of the Directorate. The DIS has never been audited since it was set up in 2008, more than a decade ago.
The institution has been a law unto itself for a longtime, feared by all oversight bodies. The Auditor General, who had no security of tenure, could not audit the DIS. The Directorate’s personnel, especially at a high level, have been implicated in corruption. Some of its operatives are in courts of law defending corruption charges preferred against them. Some of the corruption cases which appeared in the media have not made it to the courts.
The DIS has been accused of non-accountability and unethical practices as well as of being a burden on the fiscus. So, the Opposition demanded, from the President, a forensic audit for the purpose of cleaning up the DIS. They demand a start from a clean slate.
The second demand by the Opposition is that the law be reviewed to ensure greater accountability of the DIS to Parliament. What are some of the issues that the opposition think should be reviewed? The contention is that the executive cannot appoint a Committee of Parliament to scrutinize an executive institution.
Already, it is argued, Parliament is less independent and it is dominated by the executive. It is contended that the Committee should be established by the Standing Orders and be appointed by a Select Committee of Parliament. There is also an argument that the Committee should report to Parliament and not to the President and that the Minister should not have any role in the Committee.
Democratic and Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence is relatively a new phenomenon across the World. Even developed democracies are still grappling with some of these issues. However, there are acceptable standards or what might be called international best practices which have evolved over the past two or so decades.
In the UK for instance, MPs of the Intelligence and Security Committee are appointed by the Houses of Parliament, having been nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. This is a good balancing exercise of involvement of both the executive and the legislature. Consultation is taken for granted in Botswana context in the sense that it has been reduced to just informing the Leader of Opposition without much regard to his or her ideas; they are never taken seriously.
Furthermore, the current Committee in the UK has four Members of the ruling party and five MPs from the opposition. It is a fairly balanced Committee in terms of Parliamentary representation. However, as said above, the President of Botswana appointed six ruling party MPs and three from the opposition.
The imbalance is preposterous and more pronounced with clear intentions of getting the executive way through the ruling party representatives in the Committee. The intention to avoid scrutiny is clear from the numbers of the ruling party MPs in the Committee.
There is also an international standard of removing sensitive parts which may harm national security from the report before it is tabled in the legislature. The previous and current reluctance of the executive arms to open up on Defence and Security matters emanate from this very reason of preserving and protecting national security.
But national security should be balanced with public interest and other democratic principles. The decision to expunge certain information which may be prejudicial to national security should not be an arbitrary and exclusive decision of the executive but a collective decision of a well fairly balanced Committee in consultation with the Speaker and the minister responsible.
There is no doubt that the DIS has been a rogue institution. The reluctance by the President to commit to democratic-parliamentary oversight reforms presupposes a lack of commitment to democratization. The President has no interest in seeing a reformed DIS with effective oversight of the agency.
He is insincere. This is because the President loathes the idea losing an iota of power and sharing it with any other democratic institution. He sees the agency as his power lever to sustain his stay in the high office. He thought he could sanitize himself with an ineffective DIS Committee that would dance to his tune.
The non-participation of the opposition MPs renders the Committee dysfunctional; it cannot function as this would be unlawful. Participation of the opposition is a legal requirement. Even if it can meet, it would lack legitimacy; it cannot be taken seriously. The President should therefore act on the oversight demands and reform the DIS if he is to be taken seriously.
For years I have trained people about paradigm shifts – those light-bulb-switch-on moments – where there is a seismic change from the usual way of thinking about something to a newer, better way.
I like to refer to them as ‘aha’ moments because of the sudden understanding of something which was previously incomprehensible. However, the topic of today’s article is the complete antithesis of ‘aha’. Though I’d love to tell you I’d had a ‘eureka ‘, ‘problem solved’ moment, I am faced with the complete opposite – an ‘oh-no’ moment or Lost Leader Syndrome.
No matter how well prepared or capable a leader is. they often find themselves facing perplexing events, confounding information, or puzzling situations. Confused by developments of which they can’t make sense and by challenges that they don’t know how to solve they become confused, sometimes lost and completely clueless about what to do.
I am told by Jentz and Murphy (JM) in ‘What leaders do when they don’t know what to do’ that this is normal, and that rapid change is making confusion a defining feature of management in the 21st century. Now doesn’t that sound like the story of 2020 summed up in a single sentence?
The basic premise of their writing is that “confusion is not a weakness to be ashamed of but a regular and inevitable condition of leadership. By learning to embrace their confusion, managers are able to set in motion a constructive process for addressing baffling issues.
In fact, confusion turns out to be a fruitful environment in which the best managers thrive by using the instability around them to open up better lines of communication, test their old assumptions and values against changing realities, and develop more creative approaches to problem solving.”
The problem with this ideology however is that it doesn’t help my overwhelming feelings of fear and panic which is exacerbated by a tape playing on a loop in my head saying ‘you’re supposed to know what to do, do something’. My angst is compounded by annoying motivational phrases also unhelpfully playing in my head like.
Nothing happens until something moves
The secret of getting ahead is getting started
Act or be acted upon
All these platitudes are urging me to pull something out of the bag, but I know that this is a trap. This need to forge ahead is nothing but a coping mechanism and disguise. Instead of owning the fact that I haven’t got a foggy about what to do, part of me worries that I’ll lose authority if I acknowledge that I can’t provide direction – I’m supposed to know the answers, I’m the MD! This feeling of not being in control is common for managers in ‘oh no’ situations and as a result they often start reflexively and unilaterally attempting to impose quick fixes to restore equilibrium because, lets be honest, sometimes we find it hard to resist hiding our confusion.
To admit that I am lost in an “Oh, No!” moment opens the door not only to the fear of losing authority but also to a plethora of other troubling emotions and thoughts: *Shame and loss of face: “You’ll look like a fool!” * Panic and loss of control: “You’ve let this get out of hand!” * Incompetence and incapacitation: “You don’t know what you’re doing!”
As if by saying “I’m at a loss here” is tantamount to declaring “I am not fit to lead.” Of course the real problem for me and any other leader is if they don’t admit when they are disoriented, it sends a signal to others in the organisation stating it’s not cool to be lost and that, by its very nature encourages them to hide. What’s the saying about ‘a real man never asks for direction. ..so they end up driving around in circles’.
As managers we need to embrace the confusion, show vulnerability (remember that’s not a bad word) and accept that leadership is not about pretending to have all the answers but about having the courage to search with others to discover a solution.
JM point out that “being confused, however, does not mean being incapacitated. Indeed, one of the most liberating truths of leadership is that confusion is not quicksand from which to escape but rather the potter’s clay of leadership – the very stuff with which managers can work.”
2020 has certainly been a year to remember and all indications are that the confusion which has characterised this year will still follow us into the New Year, thereby making confusion a defining characteristic of the new normal and how managers need to manage. Our competence as leaders will then surely be measured not only by ‘what I know’ but increasingly by ‘how I behave when I accept, I don’t know, lose my sense of direction and become confused.
.I guess the message for all organizational cultures going forward is that sticking with the belief that we need all-knowing, omni-competent executives will cost them dearly and send a message to managers that it is better to hide their confusion than to address it openly and constructively.
Take comfort in these wise words ‘Confusion is a word we have invented for an order not yet understood’!