Certain officials of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), whose full particulars appear herein, engaged in corrupt or illegal practices to influence and distort the outcome of the election; the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS) unlawfully aided and abetted the BDP officials in executing the corrupt or illegal practices aforesaid;
Certain officials of the Independent Electoral Commission (first respondent) unlawfully aided and abetted the BDP officials in executing the corrupt or illegal practices aforesaid; The roll that was used on the polling day was not the same as the one certified by the Secretary of the first respondent;
The first respondent contravened or permitted the contravention of the provisions of section 28 of the Act. In proof of the complaints alleged to above, your petitioner shall at the hearing of this petition lead evidence from a whistleblower, Moemedi Dennis Baikalafi (Mr. Baikalafi), whose particulars are as follows: an adult self-employed man of full legal capacity resident in Gaborone; the Managing Director of Even Life Holdings (Pty) Ltd; he is also member of the Botswana Democratic Party ('BDP') Communications Support Sub-Committee.
During the run-up to the 2019 elections Mr. Baikalafi was part of the national campaign team of the BOP. This team comprised amongst others the following office bearers of the BOP, to wit; Secretary General, Mr. Mpho Balopi (Mr. Balopi), Head of Strategy, Dr. Comma Serema (Dr. Serema), and Head of Communications and International Relations Mr. Kagelelo Banks Kentse (Mr. Kentse).
In or about June 2018, a meeting attended by the BOP President Dr.Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi (Dr. Masisi), Mr. Balopi. Dr Serema, the Treasurer of the BOP Mr. Satar Dada (Mr. Dada) and Mr. Baikalafi was convened at Tsholetsa House. Also present at the meeting was the Director General of Intelligence and Security Services, Brigadier Peter Fana Magosi (Rt.) (Brigadier Magosi). In this meeting, Dr. Masisi expressed his concern of losing the forthcoming elections and those present were called upon to suggest strategies of ensuring that the President wins the elections. It was clear to all present that the message conveyed by Dr. Masisi was 'win by any means'.
It was agreed at the said meeting that the date of the elections be set for 23rd October 2019. Brigadier Magosi was to cause registration of 'front companies' to be used for money laundering purposes. An unspecified amount of money was to be transferred from a DISS 'slush fund' to the front companies. The front or dummy companies · were to pay a company referred to as Native Groups (or a company of a name closely related) under the guise of advertising for the presidency. Native Groups is owned by Mr. Balopi, the Secretary General of the BDP.
Dr Masisi, Mr. Balopi, Brigadier Magosi and Mr. Dada devised a plan to pay Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) voters' registration officials to issue more than one voter's registration card per individual to be selected, who would subsequently cast votes for the BDP. The meeting resolved that Mr. Balopi in his capacity as the Secretary General would be the over-arching coordinator of implementation of the plan that had been hatched.
The general voters' registration took place during the period of 3rct September 2018 to 11th November 2018 and it was during this period that implementation of the plan of issuance of double voters' registration cards was to be implemented. Mr. Balopi issued instructions to various coordinators spread over the length and breadth of the country to approach voter registration officers of the IEC and to bribe them so that they could effect the duplicated registration. Mr. Baikalafi was one of the coordinators given this task.
Mr. Balopi gave Mr. Baikalafi an amount of P 16 500.00 (Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Pula); P 15. 000.00 in cash and P 1 500.00 through Stanbic Mobile money transaction. In addition, he gave him a list of coordinators the latter was to manage. In particular, these were coordinators based in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve ('CKGR') being a certain Onkgolotse (mobile phone number 73925305 I 74480227).
The latter was designated the team leader for the said area and he was to arrange double registration of potential voters in Phakalane, Gaborone and Gaborone Central. The other coordinator (or team leader) was one Mmaagwe Dan (mobile phone 71615580), who was assigned the Maun area. She was assisted by her son Dan· (mobile phone 74128830) and Kefilwe Makata (mobile phone 73735524 I 72369336). Mr. Baikalafi distributed the funds given to him by Mr. Balopi between the two teams aforesaid.
The coordinators (or team leaders) assigned to different areas were required to compile a list of potential voters who were to be used in the double registration exercise referred to above. Mr. Baikalafi was charged with coordination of the CKGR and Maun, inclusive of greater Maun. With the assistance of one Fish, Tiro Mekgwe, Thato Osupile, Selwana Kesebonye, Lotty Manyapedza, Kabo Masoba and Mbakiso Tjiyapo, all BDP activists, a list of the potential double voters was compiled. This list was very copious, running into approximately 16 000 (sixteen thousand) names.
Mr. Baikalafi is aware that other teams which were part of the exercise of coordinating duplication of voters' registration and trafficking also compiled similar lists. Mr. Baikalafi states and has verily informed your petitioner, and the latter believe same to be true for reasons of his stated personal involvement both in the planning and execution of this vote fraud, that the potential voters mobilized for this fraud did not even turn up personally, or attend in person, at the various voter registration points. What was done by Mr. Baikalafi and others in his team was to: obtain the names and National Identity numbers of said potential voters and then submit them to certain identified IEC Voter Registration Officers;
have the IEC Voter Registration Officers capture the names and identity numbers of said potential voters into their voter registration booklets, after hours and at their residences; have the said IEC Voter Registration Officers issue at least two voter registration cards per such voter; collect the issued voter registration cards for safe keeping, awaiting their handing over to the voters on election day to facilitate their voting;
It was agreed that the pool for sourcing potential voters to be used in carrying out the electoral fraud was to include institutions such as military garrisons, tertiary institutions, organized community based organizations like soccer teams and cultural groups, as well as churches from. Which names and details of members could be easy to obtain.
Such names were to be, and indeed were, submitted to the identified IEC voter registration officers and duly registered as having attended personally to register when in truth they had not. Many of the names were so registered without the consent and involvement of the individuals whose names and particulars were used, the idea being to then, consequent upon their successful registration as stated, then have the National Identity Office issue National Identity cards in respect of such individuals and have the DISS collect these and hand them to identified and trusted individuals who would then present themselves at the various polling stations and impersonate the real persons of such names and particulars and accordingly vote.
Most if not all such "voters" were deployed in Gaborone Bonnington North and the rest of the Gaborone and surrounding constituencies. I have myself come across a number of individuals who state that they never attended at any polling station to register for the 2019 elections and did not expect their names to be the voters roll for these elections. They were shocked to discover after the elections that their names do actually appearin the voters roll and fear that someone else may have impersonated them and voted purporting to be them.
One such person states that he resides at Block 9 in the Gaborone Bonnington South Constituency but his name appears as registered in Block 3 in the Gaborone Bonnington North Constituency. He will be called to testify at the hearing of this matter. In Mr. Baikalafi's estimation, the total number of people who were registered as stated above and thus voted more than once in the Gaborone Bonnington North Constituency is over two thousand, which would account for at least four thousand votes ascribed to the second respondent and resulting in her being declared the winner.
Other such "mobilized" voters were registered in the same way in the other Constituencies in Gaborone and the surrounding constituencies of Tlokweng and Mogoditshane, including Lentsweletau-Mmopane and were facilitated to vote in said constituencies and then cast a second vote in Gaborone Bonnington North.
To Mr. Baikalafi's knowledge the bulk of all documentation used to prosecute the said fraud was kept in the custody of Mr. Balopi, who stored same at plot No. 55741, Tsaru Tsaru Close, Phakalane, his residence and Plot 208 Mogoditshane, being one of his properties. Mr. Baikalafi estimates that the total number of people who were used to perpetrate the double registration fraud could well run into tens of thousands.
According to the scheme of double registration, Mr. Balopi paid or facilitated the payment of willing IEC voter registration officers in the amounts between P2 000.00 and P5 000.00. The actual amount paid depended on how well the registration official negotiated. Every registration official had their own voter registration books and were allowed to take the books to their respective homes, so that they could 'work from home'.
Team leaders in various constituencies were appointed to ensure individuals were registered to vote in two or more different constituencies and to be moved to another constituency that needed more votes so that the BDP could win. This became what was called 'the mobilization. When the registration officials managing voter registration filled in Form A correctly he/she would intentionally fill in a second form using the same information as the first but omit either a letter in the same name or a number in the identity number. This caused a second 'individual' to be registered on the voters roll and two pink voter registration cards were issued to the same individual but on the system it was recorded as two separate individuals.
From my own understanding of electronic data maintenance, storage and retrieval systems, any activity undertaken on the system, such as the one kept and maintained by the first respondent, would leave an inerasable trace which would show: who accessed the system?, especially where access is by password or some such form of personal identification; What information was uploaded, deleted or altered during such access; and exactly when such access was gained.
Thus it would be easy and expedient for a proper disposal of this matter to have an audit of the data base or electronic system of the first respondent to settle this aspect. Transport, food, accommodation and incentives were then arranged by Mr. Balopi for voting day for the mobilized/ trafficked individuals.
Registration process commenced on or about September 2018 and continued for three months. There were three registration phases; general registration which took place at the registration polling stations, continuous registration which took place at the registration polling station and supplementary registration which took place at the registration polling stations.
As averred above, team leaders in various constituencies, specifically recruited to defraud the electoral process were appointed to ensure that individuals were registered to vote in two or more different constituencies in an urban area or to be moved to another constituency that needed more votes in a rural area.
In order to facilitate the said process the Election Day was ·set for Wednesday, with the Tuesday afternoon and Thursday being declared public holidays. This was the first time in Botswana's electoral history that three public holidays were declared for a general election. This was done so that buses normally used on working days could be used for 'voter trafficking' on the days before and after the elections.
Sometime in October 2019, but before the Election Day, Dr. Masisi, Mr. Balopi, Brigadier Magosi and others went on a 'tour' around the country and informed the team leaders as to how to mobilize their 'voters'. The buses arrived shortly after the team leaders were informed as they traveled to each area. The team leaders were paid a P 2 000.00 (Two Thousand Pula) stipend for September 2019 and October 2019 by Mr. Balopi and given airtime scratch cards to keep in contact. Some of the national coordinators were given cell phones. This stipend was provided for two months.
The team leaders held all the duplicate voters' cards in their possession as well as their legitimately issued voters' registration cards. They would then get the voters on the buses and travel with them to the relevant constituencies to vote. On the 22"d October 2019 the voters were transported and accommodated at facilities close to the voting stations they were to cast their votes at.
At the voting stations there were line marshals who were holding the queue stating that they were awaiting 50 or more individuals in front of them so that when the voters arrived they could get off the bus, vote quickly and leave again. Voting began at 0630 hours, but the queue started forming much earlier, so that the 'line marshals' would be in place from 0300 to ensure the trafficked voters would vote and go. Houses were 'donated' for accommodation and tents and mattresses were purchased and set up. About 70 tents were set up in Mogoditshane and tents were also set up in Gaborone, Phakalane and Block 6.
Food was purchased from 'Choppies', a local chain store and alcohol was given to the mobilized voters. Mr. Balopi had issued an instruction that no receipt was to be kept for the alcohol purchases and that payment was to be strictly by way of cash. Once the voters were done at the voting stations, they were transported to locations where lunch had been prepared for them by caterers. Both voters' registration cards were then taken from them and their names were ticked off the list, so that a record was kept of who voted. The mobilized voters were only paid their 'incentives' after they voted and had handed in their duplicate voter's registration card.
Mr. Baikalafi was directly and personally involved in the implementation of the said fraudulent scheme in respect of all Gaborone Constituencies which include Gaborone Bonnington North, and Kanye South, Mogoditshane and Tlokweng constituencies. In all these constituencies, the mode of election cheating was as tabulated above. According to Mr. Baikalafi, he was in regular communication with other coordinators involved in the said operation and that they individually told him that they successfully implemented the plan as agreed.
Save where the context otherwise reflects, all the averments made at paragraphs to 13 to 49 above, inclusively stem from what Mr. Baikalafi has verily informed your petitioner, and the latter believes same to be true for reasons of his stated personal involvement both in the planning and execution of this vote fraud.
Your petitioner had assigned two (2) polling agents at each of the polling stations in the constituency. The averments that follow herein, of what transpired at the said polling stations derives from what the polling agents verily informed your petitioner, and the latter believe same to be true for reasons of the former's personal involvement thereat.
At the polling stations and in order to facilitate the fraudulent scheme aforesaid, the presiding officers took copies of the elections rolls which the polling agents had brought with them and gave them substitute rolls, which had been manipulated to enable the fraud. Several names of potential voters who were included in the elections voters' roll certified by the first respondent were not in the substitute roll availed at the polling stations.
In the event a voter's name was excluded from the substitute roll, the presiding officers would ask him/her to leave his/her telephone number under the pretext that they would call them later. The polling officers would later call the affected voters, some would come and they were allowed to vote despite the fact that their names were not in the roll. Some prospective voters were reflected as deceased on the substitute voters' roll when they were still alive.
Some of the substitute rolls were incomplete. At Khuduga Polling Station, for instance, the roll that had been availed commenced from names starting with alphabet "M" to those starting with alphabet "Z". Later, the presiding officer brought a complete roll. However, by then a considerable number of people had already voted.
One of your petitioner's polling agents at Khuduga Polling Station, Gaolatlheope Lydia Ngaka protested the conduct of the Election Officers at the Polling Station, and her remonstrations were captured in an audio recording which will also form part of the evidence herein. Her protestations were against: the prohibition by the Election Officers of crossing out on the voters rolls supplied, of voters as they voted; the conduct by Election Officers, of allowing persons to vote whose names and details did not appear in the voters roll;
the refusal by the Election Officers to stop the voting in order to address the issue of voters rolls that were not the same and did not contain the same information as evidenced by the claim by the Election Officers in rejecting her protestations, that the names of said persons appeared in a voters roll that the Election Officers claimed to have which had not been availed to the polling agents despite the fact that the Election Officers had prevented the polling agents from bringing into the polling station a copy of the Certified Voters Roll and insisted on the polling agents using the voters roll given to them by said Election Officials.
The forcible insistence by the Presiding Officer that your petitioner's polling agent should not cross out voters who had voted made cross checking and detection of double voting difficult, if not impossible. In view of the fact that the only Voters Rolls used at the polling stations were those furnished to the polling agents at the polling station on Election Day, said voters rolls form a critical piece of evidence in this matter and should, therefore be availed to your petitioner. He has consequently requested said voters rolls from the first respondent by letter dated 6 November 2019 which was duly served on the first respondent. A copy of the letter is annexed hereto as "DGB 5".
The first respondent undertook to revert to your petitioner's attorneys in respect of the said voters’ rolls per its letter of 7 November 2019 annexed hereto as "DGB 6", subsequent to which the first respondent sought an indulgence to 14 November 2019 per its email communication of 11 November 2019 annexed hereto as "DGB 7". The first respondent then finally gave a response by letter dated 13 November 2019 a copy of which is annexed hereto as "DGB 8". The voters' rolls which were the subject of your petitioner's request communicated through his attorneys are of critical importance to this petition and he persists in his demand to be furnished therewith.
There were four (4) parliamentary candidates representing BDP, UDC, and Real Alternative Party (RAP). This notwithstanding, the ballot paper included a symbol of a fifth candidate, depicted thereon as a gem diamond. This caused confusion amongst the voters. Your petitioner contends that the first respondent has failed to deliver in the constituency he contested for, a poll that was efficient, proper, free and fair, thus abdicating its Constitutional mandate. Owing to the nature and magnitude of the fraud perpetrated and irregularities committed as averred above, it would be difficult and even impossible for the Court to ascertain the rightful winner for the Bennington North constituency.
Wherefore your petitioner prays for an Order in the following terms: directing that the second respondent was not duly elected and that no other person was or is entitled to be declared duly elected; directing that the declaration made by the Returning Officer for the said elections to the effect that the second respondent was duly elected is null and void. Declaring that the Bennington North constituency seat is vacant; certifying to the President the vacancy of the constituency seat and the cause thereof; directing that the first respondent pays the costs of this petition;
Owing to the nature and magnitude of the fraud perpetrated and irregularities committed as averred above, it would be difficult and even impossible for the Court to ascertain the rightful winner for the Bonnington North constituency. Directing that the declaration made by the Returning Officer for the said elections to the effect that the second respondent was duly elected is null and void.
Stanbic Bank Botswana Quarterly Economic Review indicates that Botswana will fail to meet some of its Vision 2036 targets, particularly unemployment reduction and reaching high-income status.
The report says this is mainly due to the slow economic growth that the country is currently experiencing. This Quarterly Economic Review focuses on the 2020 Budget Speech.
The first paper reviews the entire budget with its key observations being that this budget is prepared as prescribed by the Public Finance Management Act; the priorities it seeks to address are drawn from Vision 2036 and the eleventh
The 2020 budget Speech, which was the maiden speech by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Dr. Thapelo Matsheka, and the first after the 2019 general elections, was delivered to Parliament on the 4th of February 2020.
It has been well received by the labour unions, business community, and the public at large as well as international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It mainly derived its support from key facets including, emphasis on changing the business-as-usual approach to development; outlining the transformation agenda; fiscal reform that minimizes the negative impact on economic development and human welfare, competiveness and the decision to implement the 2019 negotiated and agreed public sector.
The budget’s progress review shows that economic growth was consistent with the NDP 11 projections, with growth of around 4 percent. At this growth rate, the country would neither ascend to a high-income status nor reduce unemployment towards the Vision 2036 target of a single digit.
Simple calculations of this review confirm that the economy will need to grow the Vision 2036’s target of 6 percent over the next 16 years for per capita income to increase from around USD 8,000.00 to above USD 12,000.00 in current prices.
Further, the population is anticipated to grow by only 2 percent per annum.
For this reason, the focal areas for the forthcoming FY’s budget include measures to increase economic growth towards an average of 6 percent per annum.
Economic diversification is reportedly progressing fairly well. The report says, the share of the non-mining private sector in value added has risen to 66 percent in 2018 from to 63 percent in 2015.
The sectoral pattern of growth showed that the performance of services sector (particularly transport & communications, trade, hotels & restaurants, and finance & business services) has been the silver lining and that of mining sector was subdued whilst the utility sector disappointed.
The drive towards the service sector of the economy, especially to low-productivity activities (tourism, public administration, wholesaling and retailing) does not bode well for the country’s development aspirations.
In the previous versions of this Quarterly Review, it was noted that there is need for the rethinking of economic diversification. Since the country’s domestic market is small, it is inevitable that economic diversification not only focus on broadening the product mix, but also the composition of exports and markets.
This understanding of economic diversification has not been embraced by this year’s budget. Consequently, Botswana’s exports are still overwhelmingly diamonds, which means that the rest of economic sectors are still highly dependent on foreign-exchange earnings from diamonds. Thus, “the transformation programme requires a review of the country’s entire ecosystem”.
The budget review of the economic context also depicts that an economy with positive medium-term prospects, with growth expected to recover to 4.4 percent in 2020 from the expected growth of 36 percent in 2019 largely due to faster growth of services sectors and, thereafter, to slow-down to 4 percent in 2021.
These projected growth rates are comparable to those of the IMF staff’s baseline scenario of 4.2 percent in 2020 and 4 percent in 2021. Thus, the business-as-usual scenario produces growth rates that are still too low to achieve Botswana’s development objectives and create enough jobs to absorb the new entrants into the labour market.
Trade tensions between the two major markets for diamond exports, viz., the United States of America and China, is one of the factors that are cited as contributing to, indeed, undermining not only the domestic growth, but also the fiscal position.
Another notable downside risk to both global and domestic growth is outbreak of the coronavirus in China around January 2020. This has been declared as a global health emergency. In an attempt to contain the spread of the novel coronavirus pneumonia, the Chinese authorities have ordered city lockdowns and extended holidays, of course, at the expense of near- term economic growth, according to the new Stanbic Bank Botswana report.
According to Nomura Holdings Inc., fewer migrant workers returned for work than in previous years and business activities have been slow to pick up. The havoc wreaked by the virus on the world’s second largest economy is likely to spill over to the global economy. In fact, it has resulted in a glut in crude oil and, thereby placed oil markets into a contango, i.e., a market structure where near-term prices trade at a discount to future contracts.
It also presents significant risks one of Botswana’s main drivers of economic growth, diversification and foreign exchange earnings. According to the Financial Times (February 13, 2020), Chinese tourists spent $130 billion overseas in 2018. Regardless of whether the growth materializes, the projected domestic growth rate would not transform the economy to a high-income one.
Progress towards reduction of unemployment, to a target of single digit, and poverty and achieving inclusive growth has also been relatively slow, the Stanbic Bank Botswana Review says.
Ministry of Presidential Affairs, Governance and Public Administration (MOPAGPA) has through the Office of the President (OP) proposed to avail Orapa House for use by private training institutions as well as research institutions involved in the area of technology development.
For a very long time the monumental building located in the heart of the city has been a white elephant, despite government purchasing it for nearly P80 million from De Beers in 2012.
However, government has now identified a productive use for the iconic building. “The overall vision is for the building to be transformed into a hub for digital technology research and development to be carried-out by institutions, such as; Limkokwing University, BIUST, BITRI and other relevant stakeholders.”
The decision was taken as government traverse a new path of transforming the economy from a mineral led economy to a knowledge based economy through the promotion of research and innovation. However, the facility will need major maintenance to be carried-out in order to meet the requirements of the proposed change in use.
“The work will include provision of laboratories, work stations, production areas and seminar rooms; audio visual centre, high speed internet connectivity, exhibition areas and offices,” reads the proposal note for the development.
These developments will be done through the refurbishment and maintenance of the main building, workshop, and ablution block, gate house, parking area, grounds, and access control and security service.
“There will be minimal modifications to the structure as it stands. The project is estimated to cost approximately P50, 000, 000,” says the report. In this regard, it is said, the initial scope of the OP facility will be modified to accommodate the envisaged digital technology research and development hub.
With funds needed to improve the building, OP has requested that; “the 2020/21 annual budget provision for Orapa House will need to be increased by P37,500,000 from P2,500,000 to P40,000,000 to kick start the maintenance works.” Funds will be sourced from the projects that have been delayed due to Covid-19 protocols during the 2020/21 financial year.
The building has been a thorny issue for government for years. Initially, OP was expected to move there but the move never materialised. At one point it was a question of whether the Office of the President and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development were planning to override a decision by Parliament which rejected the proposal to buy Orapa House under the belief that government may be buying its own property. The building was to be bought at a negotiated cost of P79 million.
Again in 2012, Government had wanted to buy Orapa House for a negotiated P79m but the Finance and Estimates Committee of Parliament had rejected the request because of the inconsistencies realised in the supporting documents of the proposed procurement. The valuation of the building was put at P74 million.
The Ministry of Lands and Housing had initially offered De Beers P73, 000,000 as the purchase price. However, De Beers countered with P85, 000,000. On negotiation and converging of the minds, the selling price was finally agreed at P79, 000,000.
Auditor General, Pulane Letebele, has expressed discontentment at the worrying and deteriorating state of brigades in the country.
In an audit inspection which was carried out at Tshwaragano Brigade in Gabane, a number of observations showed weaknesses and shortcomings in the conduct of the financial affairs of the institution.
According to Letebele’s report, former students of the brigade had been engaged to carry out maintenance works on the school premises, comprising of painting, tiling, plumbing and electrical works, which covered the period from July 2017 to June 2018.
Although the agreed maintenance period had elapsed, the works had not been completed because of unavailability of funds and this situation had persisted up till the time of inspection in November 2019.
Auditor General says arrangements should have been made in time for funds to be available to complete these relatively minor works even before the works commenced.
Various contractors had been engaged for clearing the bush and for the supply of concrete stones, pit and river sand and hiring equipment for digging the trench towards the construction of an auto mechanics workshop, the report said.
It stated that the cost of services and supplies provided totalled P117 949.80. However, despite the services and the supplies having been paid for, the construction works had not commenced for a long period afterwards, resulting in the trench filling back in.
The audit inquiries had not elicited satisfactory responses as both the institution and the Ministry had not accepted the responsibility for the project, although orders for the provision for the supplies had been made. For their part, the Ministry had stated that they had sub warranted funds for the purchase of porta cabins.
Letebele indicated that it is therefore confusing that a project which is critical to the functioning of an institution such as this one would commence without a well-defined plan.
Furthermore, the accounting and maintenance of records for the supplies items were not of the standard prescribed by the Supplies Regulations and Procedures in that the supplies ledger cards, the main accounting records for Government assets, were not properly maintained for the recording of receipts and issues.
This had resulted in significant discrepancies between physical and ledger balances, while in other instances the supplies items had not been recorded at all.
The report says 24 of the 91 new computers found in the computer laboratory at Kumakwane ABC campus were not recorded anywhere, as were the other computers in the storeroom which could not be counted due to the disorderly storage conditions.
The institution had entered into a contract agreement with a security company for the provision of security services at Tshwaragano Brigade, ABC and Horticulture campuses at Kumakwane for a 2-year period which ended in June 2018, WeekendPost learnt.
After the contract expired in June 2018, an extension was granted till the 30th September 2018. Since then, there has been no security service coverage for the institution to-date. According to Auditor General, in the face of prevailing crimes, it is of paramount importance that government properties be protected by provision of security services at all times.
At Tlokweng Brigade, it was noted that the kitchen staff were working under difficult conditions as the kitchen facilities and equipment, such as the cold room, tilting pot, food warmers and solar power for hot water were dysfunctional. The kitchen roof was leaking and men’s restrooms was not working. All these need to be brought to a reasonable and functional state of repair.
The kitchen staff should use a purpose-designed Rations Ledger for the recording of receipts and issues of foodstuffs to reflect the usage of those items. As far back as 2014 the Department of Buildings and Engineering Services had found that the house occupied by the bursar was uninhabitable on account of structural defects, the report said.
A site visit during the audit had established that the house was indeed unfit for occupation as there were cracks on the walls, power switches were not working and the roof was leaking. On a sadder note, there were a number of finished items of clothing, such as dresses, shirts, and jackets from students’ practical exercises from the Fashion Design Textiles Workshop.
Auditor General shared her take on this, saying: “I have not been able to ascertain the policy on the disposal of products from these practicals. A trace of 103 green acid-proof overalls which had been purchased in August 2018 had indicated that there was no record of these items having been recorded or issued, nor were they available in stock. I was not able to obtain any explanation for this situation.”
Kgatleng brigade was also audited and inspected by Auditor General who observed that the brigade has 26 institutional houses at Bokaa, both old campus and new campus. Some of these houses are very old and dilapidated, with two declared uninhabitable. The condition of the houses is a clear indication of lack of care and maintenance of these properties.
At the time of the audit, there was no contractor engaged for the provision of security guard services at the new campus, after expiry of the previous one in July 2019. It is hoped that steps would be taken to safeguard the security of the premises and government properties against any acts of hooliganism.
In August 2019, there was a break-in at the electrical and at the plumbing maintenance workshops and a number of high value items, such as drilling machines, bolt cutters, spanners and cables, were stolen. The break-in and theft were reported to the police.
“However, at the time of writing this report I was not aware of the outcome of the police investigation, nor of any loss report submitted in terms of the Supplies Regulations and Procedures,” Letebele said.